![]() Users falling into one of the three groups described above should consider using Tor bridges. Using bridges might be advisable to prevent identification as a Tor user, but the Tor Project's bridges documentation is primarily focused on censorship circumvention, that is, overcoming attempts by ISPs or government to block Tor use. Warning: Bridges are important tools that work in many cases but they are not an absolute protection against the technical progress an adversary might make in identifying Tor users. The third group is only concerned with testing bridge connections. Note that the meek_azure pluggable transport may be necessary to deal with highly aggressive ISP censorship or national firewalls, like those found in China and the Middle East. ![]() In this case private bridges should be utilized instead of public obfuscated bridges, as this makes it harder (not impossible) to detect Tor. The second user group is unable to safely start Whonix ™ in the default configuration due to Tor being considered dangerous or suspicious in their locality. This group is not worried about hiding the use of Tor and will need to use bridges or possibly other circumvention tools. ![]() #FTE TOR BRIDGE VS OBFS3 OFFLINE#Circumvention is necessary because Whonix ™ would otherwise be rendered useless for most activities except working offline on documents and so on, since all Internet traffic is routed through Tor by default. The first group of users is only concerned with circumventing Tor censorship that is based on IP address or fingerprinting of protocols.
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